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This paper examines progress in establishing mutual recognition arrangements for 
Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) programs under the World Customs Organization’s 
SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. In particular, it 
considers the likely impact on industry and customs administrations of the current bilateral 
approach to establishing mutual recognition agreements, and recommends a plurilateral 
approach that will minimise the proliferation of such agreements and, in doing so, reduce 
the regulatory burden on both administrators and the trading community.2
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The concept of ‘Authorised Economic Operator’
The World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and 
Facilitate Global Trade (WCO 2012a), or the SAFE Framework as it is commonly known, is widely 
recognised as an international standard. At the time of writing, some 167 countries had either 
commenced implementation of the SAFE Framework or expressed their intention to do so.
The initial focus of the SAFE Framework, as its name implies, was to secure the international 
supply chain in a manner that also facilitates trade. The first iteration of the instrument drew 
heavily on the US Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program which has a 
clear anti-terrorism focus, and is designed to provide US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
with a method of identifying and focusing resources on potentially high-risk consignments, that 
is, those that do not form part of a supply chain that is assessed to be ‘secure’. According to CBP, 
the C-TPAT initiative seeks the cooperation of businesses ‘to protect the supply chain, identify 
security gaps, and implement specific security measures and best practices’ (CBP 2012).
1  Head of School, Centre for Customs and Excise Studies, Charles Sturt University, Australia, dwiddowson@csu.edu.au
2  This paper is broadly based on and represents an update of the author’s earlier article: David Widdowson 2012, ‘Mutual 
recognition of AEO programs: a regional solution’, paper presented to the Customs Academic Conference on National 
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The US approach to C-TPAT and indeed the WCO’s initial approach to the SAFE Framework, 
appear to be perfectly logical from a risk management perspective. In the context of a 
partnership against terrorism or an instrument designed to secure the international supply 
chain, a high risk consignment is logically one that represents a risk to supply chain safety 
and security. Having identified the potential risk, the next step is to determine appropriate 
ways of mitigating the risk. This is where the concept of the Authorised Economic Operator 
(AEO) or ‘trusted trader’ comes into play. An AEO, which is at the heart of both C-TPAT and 
the SAFE Framework, is essentially a member of the international trading community that is 
deemed to comply with the relevant supply chain security standards.3
The AEO concept represents a partnership arrangement between Customs and Industry 
that is designed to provide incentives for businesses that meet defined supply chain security 
standards. According to the WCO, ‘AEOs will reap benefits, such as faster processing 
of goods by Customs, e.g. through reduced examination rates… These processes will 
ensure that AEOs see a benefit to their investment in good security systems and practices, 
including reduced risk-targeting assessments and inspections, and expedited processing of 
their goods’.4
Broader focus
When the SAFE Framework was first released in June 2005, there was an apparent conflict 
between the criteria required to become an AEO as specified in Annex 2 of the document 
and the prose contained in its Annex 1 which purported to summarise those provisions. 
Annex 1, Paragraph 1.4.1 of the 2005 document states:
Authorised Economic Operators who meet criteria specified by the Customs (see 
Annex 2) should be entitled to participate in simplified and rapid release procedures 
on the provision of minimum information. The criteria include having an appropriate 
record of compliance with Customs requirements [emphasis added], a demonstrated 
commitment to supply chain security by being a participant in a Customs-Business 
partnership programme, and a satisfactory system for managing their commercial 
records (WCO 2005). 
The statement ‘the criteria include having an appropriate record of compliance with Customs 
requirements’ was an apparent anomaly as the criteria specified in Annex 2 made no 
reference to any requirements other than those relating to supply chain safety and security.
This raised the question of whether the proposed AEO arrangements were designed to 
have a specific focus on the safety and security of the international trade supply chain, or 
whether a broader focus on overall regulatory compliance was in fact intended. If the former 
was the case, it would be appropriate to remove the phrase in question from paragraph 
1.4.1. If, however, the latter interpretation was correct, it would be appropriate to expand the 
criteria in Annex 2 accordingly.
3  The WCO definition of an Authorised Economic Operator is ‘a party involved in the international movement of goods in 
whatever function that has been approved by or on behalf of a national Customs administration as complying with WCO 
or equivalent supply chain security standards. AEOs may include manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, 
consolidators, intermediaries, ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, distributors and freight 
forwarders’ (WCO 2012a)
4  WCO 2012a, p. 6
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These concerns were brought to the attention of the then Secretary General of the WCO, 
whose position on the matter was clear: ‘... from a Customs perspective, a participant’s 
reliability history and consistent adherence to basic Customs requirements, even outside of 
the security context, is so fundamental as to form the foundation for all special programme 
participation. This is especially true when considering programmes with a security emphasis, 
such as SAFE’.5
The AEO guidelines that were subsequently issued by the WCO went to great lengths to 
emphasise this point (WCO 2006), and the second iteration of the SAFE Framework, issued 
in 2007, states that, since its introduction in 2005, ‘work has progressed on modernizing 
and improving the document, principally by incorporating into its text detailed provisions 
concerning Authorized Economic Operators’ (WCO 2007, p. i). 
There appears, however, to have been some re-writing of history on the part of the WCO, 
and its website now states, ‘In June 2005 the WCO Council adopted the SAFE Framework 
of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework) that would act as 
a deterrent to international terrorism, secure revenue collections [emphasis added] and 
promote trade facilitation worldwide’ (WCO 2012b). That was certainly not the stated 
intention at the time the SAFE Framework was introduced in 2005.
The European Union (EU) was the first to adopt the broader definition espoused by the 
WCO by requiring an AEO to demonstrate:
•	 an appropriate record of compliance with customs requirements
•	 a satisfactory system of managing commercial and, where appropriate, transport 
records, which allows appropriate customs controls
•	 where appropriate, proven financial solvency
•	 where applicable, appropriate security and safety standards (EC 2007).
Such criteria go well beyond the security agenda which originally triggered the development 
of the SAFE Framework, and introduce a layer of complexity which results in a coupling of 
two quite different concepts – that of a compliant trader and that of a secure supply chain.
Through its so-called ‘SAFE Package’, the WCO has provided a great deal of information 
to assist countries in building internationally consistent AEO programs. Of special note is 
Annex III to the 2012 edition of the SAFE Framework, ‘AEO Conditions, Requirements and 
Benefits’. The Annex provides some very clear guidelines for governments that are seeking 
to establish AEO programs, as well as minimum standards for economic operators wishing 
to become certified under a national program. These guidelines, for practical purposes, are 
considered to represent the baseline for any new AEO program, as they also constitute the 
minimum criteria for mutual recognition with the established programs of the EU, Japan, 
and the United States.6
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been supportive of the AEO concept through 
its trade facilitation agenda. At its Ninth Ministerial Conference, the WTO finally reached 
consensus on a text for a new Agreement on Trade Facilitation.7 The agreement, which will 
need to be ratified by the members but which may come into effect as early as mid-2014, 
5  Letter to the author from the then Secretary General of the WCO, dated 13 June 2006
6  Widdowson, Blegen, Kashubsky & Grainger 2014, pp. 18, 19
7  WTO 2013
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would be binding on all WTO members. Its scope is extensive, but of particular relevance to 
the current subject is the following:
Trade facilitation measures for authorized operators
Each Member shall provide additional trade facilitation measures related to import, export 
or transit formalities and procedures, pursuant to paragraph 7.3, to operators who meet 
specified criteria, hereinafter called authorized operators. Alternatively, a Member may offer 
such facilitation measures through customs procedures generally available to all operators 
and not be required to establish a separate scheme.
The specified criteria shall be related to compliance, or the risk of non-compliance, with 
requirements specified in a Member’s laws, regulations or procedures. The specified 
criteria, which shall be published, may include:
a. an appropriate record of compliance with customs and other related laws and regulations;
b. a system of managing records to allow for necessary internal controls;
c. financial solvency, including, where appropriate, provision of a sufficient security/ 
guarantee; and
d. supply chain security.8
The implication of the text of these provisions is that if a country elects to introduce an 
‘Authorized Operator’ program, it has a level of flexibility in terms of the criteria that may be 
applied. Note also that the criteria identified by the WTO are consistent with those contained 
in the SAFE Framework. In the event that a WTO member state elects to establish such 
a program, the Agreement would obligate the WTO member state to provide Authorized 
Operators with a minimum of three of the following benefits:
The trade facilitation measures provided pursuant to paragraph 7.1 shall include at least 3 
of the following measures:
a. low documentary and data requirements as appropriate;
b. low rate of physical inspections and examinations as appropriate;
c. rapid release time as appropriate;
d. deferred payment of duties, taxes, fees and charges;
e. use of comprehensive guarantees or reduced guarantees;
f. a single customs declaration for all imports or exports in a given period; and
g. clearance of goods at the premises of the authorized operator or another place authorized 
by customs.
Although Article 7 proceeds to encourage members to develop Authorized Operator 
programs on the basis of ‘international standards’ (without any specific mention of such 
standards), and to allow for mutual recognition arrangements, the provision is notable for 
the absence of any binding or formal adoption of related principles as set out in the SAFE 
Framework.9
8  WTO 2013, Article 7, Section 7
9  Widdowson, Blegen, Kashubsky & Grainger 2014, p. 11
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Mutual recognition
The fact that non-security related considerations have been incorporated into the 
SAFE Framework, or may be included in the WTO’s concept of ‘Authorized Operator’ is 
not of particular concern. What is of concern is the way in which the SAFE Framework 
considerations were originally introduced, leading to confusion among WCO Members as 
they set out to implement their national AEO programs. As a result, some went the way of 
the EU and others approached the issue from a purely security perspective. Singapore’s 
AEO program,10 for example, was launched with a specific focus on supply chain safety 
and security. That does not suggest that Singapore has no interest in general compliance 
issues but rather that they are not regarded as relevant factors when determining whether 
a consignment may or may not pose a security risk.
An unfortunate casualty of this failure to agree on basic AEO criteria is the concept of 
mutual recognition. If one administration requires a company to demonstrate levels of both 
general compliance and security compliance before being granted AEO status, and another 
grants AEO status solely on the basis of security compliance, the achievement of mutual 
recognition becomes problematic. This is, of course, unless the parties are prepared to 
adopt a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach (Widdowson & Holloway 2009).
The need for consistency and clarity was recognised in the original version of the SAFE 
Framework which states, ‘One of the main tenets of the Framework is to create one set of 
international standards and this establishes uniformity and predictability. It also reduces 
multiple and complex reporting requirements’ (WCO 2005, p. 10). The need for clarity is 
further identified in the current version of the Framework: ‘In order to garner and keep 
private sector support, it is necessary that there be a clear statement concerning what is 
entailed in being an AEO. There must be a common understanding of the conditions and 
requirements of AEO status, which should be specifically enumerated in detail in national 
AEO programmes’ (WCO 2012a, p. III/1).
Further, the WCO states that, ‘In order for a system of mutual recognition to work it is 
essential that ... there be an agreed set of common standards’ (WCO 2012a, p. 33). The 
reference to an agreed set of common standards is of particular significance, given the 
fact that the SAFE Framework itself has ostensibly been promulgated with the intention 
of setting such standards. However, the establishment of standards only goes part of the 
way to achieving international consistency. Of equal importance is the need for consistent 
interpretation of the standards, which is where the strategy is in danger of failing.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) further highlights the 
importance of achieving mutual recognition from the perspective of developing economies:
In the longer term, mutual recognition of AEO status will be critical to ensure that 
operators who comply with the criteria set out in the SAFE Framework and have 
obtained AEO status in their own country are in fact able to enjoy the benefits outlined 
in the SAFE Framework and may participate in international trade on equal terms. 
In the absence of a system for global mutual recognition of AEO status, traders from 
some countries, particularly developing economies, may find themselves at a serious 
competitive disadvantage (UNCTAD 2008, p. 111).
10  The Singapore program, launched in May 2007, is referred to as the Secure Trade Partnership (STP)
David Widdowson
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A similar view is expressed by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which ‘has 
maintained that achievement of a mutual recognition process for companies implementing 
the Framework procedures is a top priority. Mutual recognition is necessary to capture the 
trade benefit of a world standard for security and trade facilitation’ (ICC 2009).
The use of inconsistent criteria has, to this point, been a stumbling block in mutual recognition 
negotiations, the most prominent being those between the US and EU. There are some 
fundamental differences between the US C-TPAT and EU AEO schemes. Not only do they 
differ in terms of eligibility criteria (the focus of C-TPAT being security, not general regulatory 
compliance) but also in their application, as C-TPAT does not currently have an export 
focus. In this regard, the ICC comments:
The scope of the EU’s AEO Program includes both import and export processes, while 
C-TPAT focuses solely on the security of goods imported into the US. To the extent 
that AEO is concerned with the export security of goods originating in the territory of 
the EU as well as those arriving in its territory, it may in this regard provide relatively 
more protection to its trading partners that have programs like C-TPAT than it receives 
in return from such partners (ICC 2009, p. 3).
Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made on the mutual recognition front, despite 
these basic differences. Firstly, on 4 May 2012 agreement was reached by the US-EU Joint 
Customs Cooperation Committee (JCCC) on a form of mutual recognition of the respective 
programs (see EC 2012). Application of the agreement is by necessity restricted to security 
elements, and ‘to the extent practicable and possible and consistent with applicable law and 
policy’,11 but at least a start has been made. Secondly, CBP is now furthering the adoption of 
a more expansive model in the interests of achieving a greater degree of mutual recognition 
between C-TPAT and other AEO programs:
Expanding C-TPAT will also require intensified efforts to harmonize the program with 
similar authorized economic operator (AEO) programs in other countries so that 
overseas companies certified by other national authorities as having secure supply 
chain practices can be granted equivalent treatment as C-TPAT importers ... To achieve 
so-called mutual recognition, however, CBP has to assess the other program’s rules 
for reviewing corporate security and how they are implemented. 
The broader approach being heralded by CBP signals a shift to expand C-TPAT beyond 
security to also be a quality-assurance program for trade compliance, more in line with 
the WCO standards that require AEOs to also demonstrate compliance with general 
customs requirements and to show financial viability (Kulisch 2011).
Progress towards this broader approach was made in June 2014, when CBP announced 
its proposal to proceed with a ‘Trusted Trader Program Test’ that would adopt a whole-of-
government approach to trader assessment that encompasses both supply chain security 
and trade compliance:
CBP seeks to encourage entities through incentives not currently available to members 
participating in both Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and 
Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) to secure their supply chains and strengthen their 
11  Section III, clause 1 of the JCCC Decision
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internal controls for compliance with the existing laws and regulations administered or 
enforced by CBP.12
Considerable progress in furthering mutual recognition agreements under the SAFE 
Framework has also been made in other parts of the world, with many countries having 
already implemented mutual recognition agreements. These agreements have two primary 
features: cooperation between the customs administrations of the two countries, and 
collaboration in providing defined benefits to AEOs certified under one country’s program 
when their consignments are processed at the border of the other. The current status of 
mutual recognition programs is shown in Table 1.13
In addition, the following countries are expected to commence negotiations within the next 
two years:
•	 Korea-Indonesia
•	 Canada – EU
•	 EU – Korea
•	 EU – New Zealand
•	 EU – Singapore
•	 Hong Kong, China – Japan
•	 Hong Kong, China – Malaysia
•	 Hong Kong, China – New Zealand
•	 Hong Kong, China – Taiwan
•	 Hong Kong, China – Thailand
•	 Rwanda – other East African Community (EAC) countries14
•	 Japan – Vietnam
Further, reference to mutual recognition agreements has formed part of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) treaty negotiations, which will cover all of the major Pacific Rim economies 
except China and Russia, and this trend of anchoring mutual recognition arrangements into 
trade agreements and treaties is almost certain to continue in the US-EU Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership discussions. 
Table 1. Mutual Recognition Programs
Operational Under negotiation
Date Countries Countries
June 2007 New Zealand-USA China-EU (pilot since 2009)
May 2008 Japan-New Zealand China-Japan
June 2008 Canada-USA Japan-Malaysia
June 2008 Jordan-USA China-Korea
June 2009 Japan-USA India-Korea
July 2009 EU-Norway1 Israel-Korea
July 2009 EU-Switzerland2 Norway-Switzerland
June 2010 Canada-Japan Singapore-USA
12  www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/06/16/2014-13992/announcement-of-trusted-trader-program-test
13  Widdowson, Blegen, Kashubsky & Grainger 2014, p. 23
14  The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda
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June 2010 Canada-Korea Switzerland-USA
June 2010 Canada-Singapore Israel-USA
June 2010 EU-Japan Mexico-USA
June 2010 Korea-Singapore China-USA
June 2010 Korea-USA Hong Kong, China-Singapore
January 2011 Andorra-EU Israel-Taiwan
May 2011 Japan-Korea India-Taiwan
June 2011 Korea-New Zealand Singapore-Taiwan
June 2011 Japan-Singapore China-Taiwan
May 2012 EU-USA New Zealand-Singapore
June 2012 China-Singapore Japan-Switzerland
November 2012 Taiwan-USA
July 2013 Singapore-Taiwan (pilot)
October 2013 China-Hong Kong, China
November 2013 India, Hong Kong, China
February 2014 Hong Kong, China-Korea
March 2014 Korea-Mexico
Source: based on Widdowson et al. (2014) 
Plurilateral approach
While the EU features fairly prominently in this list (see Figure 1), something that is often 
overlooked is the particularly significant achievement of the EU in providing its trading 
partners with a facilitated mechanism to establish agreements with its Member States. It 
has accomplished this by reaching internal agreement among its 28 Member States on the 
way in which the SAFE Framework should be interpreted and applied, resulting in a single 
EU AEO scheme, albeit with some national variations in practice. This has eliminated the 
need for its trading partners to engage in bilateral negotiations with individual EU Member 
States, effectively reducing the number of negotiations by a factor of 28.
Furthermore, as there is no requirement for arrangements to be established between the 
EU Member States, each mutual recognition agreement between a country and the EU 
essentially represents the equivalent of 406 bilateral negotiations, based on the formula:
n!
(n-r)!(r)!
Where: n = total number of countries (in this case 29); and r = number of countries involved 
in each agreement (two in the case of bilateral agreements).
From this we can see that mutual recognition arrangements have been significantly 
simplified by virtue of the fact that the 28 Member States of the EU have established a 
single AEO program.
Globally, mutual recognition is currently being furthered on a bilateral basis, and in each case 
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there are some limitations, restrictions and disparate practices and procedures. Consider 
for a moment what it would mean for the 179 WCO Members if each had an AEO program 
in place, and mutual recognition was to be achieved across all such programs. Taking 
into account the fact that the EU initiative has effectively reduced the potential number of 
‘national’ programs from 179 to 152, the number of bilateral agreements that would need to 
be struck in order to achieve this ambition is 11,476, with each country being involved in the 
negotiation of 151 individual agreements.
Such a scenario would not only place a burden on the administrators charged with negotiating 
and maintaining the agreements, but also the international trading community faced with 
such a proliferation of administrative procedures.
One way to overcome this emerging problem is to seek to adopt a plurilateral approach, 
as has effectively been adopted by the EU, by encouraging economies to collaborate in 
establishing common AEO programs. For example, those countries that form part of, or are 
negotiating Free Trade Agreements, such as the Member States of ASEAN,15 the GCC,16 
SADC,17 and APEC,18 and those currently negotiating the RCEP19 TPP20.  This would not 
only reduce the number of mutual recognition agreements required but also introduce a 
greater degree of uniformity in the application of the AEO concept and associated SAFE 
Framework initiatives.
In suggesting such an approach, it is recognised that the EU has achieved a particularly 
sophisticated level of regional economic integration, managed by way of enforceable 
directives and regulation in order to achieve a high degree of regional consistency.  While 
such a level of economic integration is well beyond the reach and/or objectives of other 
regional initiatives, all of which lack the regulatory rigour of the EU, there still exists an 
opportunity for parties to such agreements to enhance their cooperation on customs policy 
and procedure, including greater harmonisation of their AEO and related initiatives.
Conclusions
The SAFE Framework, including the AEO concept, now provides sound standards on 
which to base an internationally consistent approach to the identification and recognition 
of trusted members of the trading community. The establishment of mutual recognition 
arrangements, upon which the success of the AEO initiative is dependent, is being inhibited, 
partly by inconsistent interpretation of the AEO criteria but also by the size of the task due 
to the bilateral nature of negotiations. The adoption of a plurilateral approach to the issue, 
possibly based on regionally-agreed AEO programs will not only facilitate and simplify 
mutual recognition negotiations and program administration but will also serve to reduce 
the regulatory burden of the international trading community.
15  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
16  Gulf Cooperation Council
17  South African Development Community
18  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
19  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
20  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
David Widdowson
76  | JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.2, pp. 67 - 77   
References
CBP (2012) C-TPAT Overview, 
www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ctpat_program_information/
what_is_ctpat/ctpat_overview.ctt/ctpat_overview.pdf.
EC (2007) ‘Authorised Economic Operators: guidelines’, Working Document 
TAXUD/2006/1450, European Commission, Brussels.
EC (2012) ‘Decision of the US-EU Joint Customs Cooperation Committee of 4 May 2012, 
Official Journal of the European Union, 5 June 2012, pp. L144/44-L144/47.
ICC (2009) Discussion Paper, ‘ICC recommendations on mutual recognition of US-EU trade 
partner programs for border security’, Final Document 104-54, International Chamber of 
Commerce, Paris.
Kulisch, Eric 2011, ‘Bersin: C-TPAT strategy involves doing more with less’, American 
Shipper, viewed 15 June (2011) www.americanshipper.com/newweb/fc/FLC_story_P.
asp?news=189846.
UNCTAD (2008) ‘Review of maritime transport’, Document UNCTAD/RMT/2008, ISBN 978-
92-1-112758-4, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva.
Widdowson, David & Holloway, Stephen (2009) ‘Maritime transport security regulation: 
policies, probabilities and practicalities’, paper presented to the OECD/International 
Transport Forum 2009 Workshop Ensuring a Secure Global Transport System, Leipzig, 
Germany, May.
Widdowson, David (2012) ‘Mutual recognition of AEO programs: a regional solution’, paper 
presented to the Customs Academic Conference on National Security – Globally Networked 
Customs, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, October 2012.
Widdowson, David, Blegen, Bryce, Kashubsky, Mikhail & Grainger, Andrew (2014) ‘Review 
of accredited operator schemes’, CCES, Canberra
WCO (2005) WCO SAFE Framework of standards to secure and facilitate global trade, 
World Customs Organization, Brussels.
WCO (2006) WCO SAFE Framework of standards, Authorized Economic Operator 
guidelines, World Customs Organization, Brussels.
WCO (2007) WCO SAFE Framework of standards to secure and facilitate global trade, 
World Customs Organization, Brussels.
AEO: a plurilateral approach to mutual recognition
JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.2, pp. 67 - 77 |  77 
WCO (2012a) WCO SAFE Framework of standards to secure and facilitate global trade, 
World Customs Organization, Brussels.
WCO (2012b) WCO SAFE package: WCO tools to secure and facilitate global trade, viewed 
25 September 2012, www.wcoomd.org/home_pfoverviewboxes_safepackage.htm.
 
WTO (2013) Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(13)/36, WT/L/911, World Trade Organization, Geneva.
